Validating and restoring defense in depth using attack graphs

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This paper presents an approach based on Boolean Satisfiability Solving (SAT Solving) that can reason about attacks, usability requirements, cost of actions, etc. Preliminary results show that the approach is both effective and efficient.Past work has provided ways to identify intricate attack paths due to misconfiguration and vulnerabilities in an enterprise system, but little has been done to address how to correct the security problems within the context of various other requirements...This work is sponsored by the United States Air Force under Air Force Contract FA8721-05-C-0002.Opinions, interpretations, conclusions and recommendations are those of the authors and are not necessarily endorsed by the United States Government.Enterprise network security management is a complex task of balancing security and usability, with trade-offs often necessary between the two.Past work has provided ways to identify intricate attack paths due to misconfiguration and vulnerabilities in an enterprise system, but little has been done to address how to correct the security problems within the context of various other requirements such as usability, ease of access, and cost of countermeasures.With the number of vulnerabilities growing rapidly, repairing all vulnerabilities costs much.

Defense in depth is often depicted as a two-dimensional representation (drawing) of a three dimensional object (e.g. security) that rarely reflects the multi-dimensional issues of an information sphere.Can we accept that the security of information is not the same as the security of systems?If you were to draw a Venn diagram of the two they would intersect but neither would encompass the other. It is possible that this discontinuity is the reason that information assurance and security of information may not be a solvable problem under the current paradigm.Users can also compute and view metrics of assets captured versus attacker effort to compare the security of complex networks.For adversaries with three skill levels, it is possible to create graphs of assets captured versus attacker steps and the number of unique exploits required.

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